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Male Prostitution & Equal Protection: An Enforcement Dilemma
THAYNE D. STODDARD*
I was in my first weeks of law school, desperately outlining, briefing, and
constantly studying, when I was first exposed to prostitution. I had just returned
home from an afternoon studying and was changing into gym clothes when I
heard a knock at my door. I opened the door to an attractive, young AfricanAmerican woman who I had seen walking in my neighborhood. After
exchanging greetings, she asked me if I wanted to “hang out.” I thought the
question a benign one, and while we had talked once or twice, I was a little
confused as to how she knew where I lived, and why she had singled me out. At
my confused expression, she explained, “You know, make some heat.” Being
rather slow, I still must have looked confused, as her tone became exasperated,
and she blurted out, “I’m trickin’!” Embarrassed at my denseness, slightly
offended, a little scared, and blushing furiously, I told her that I was sorry and I
wasn’t really interested, but I’d be happy to grab a meal with her sometime. Yes,
in my anxious state, I asked a prostitute to join me for dinner. As she walked out
the door, she turned, and with a broken look, asked if there was no way that I
could help her. I didn’t know what to say.
The experience brought into sharp reality the facts that I had heard about
prostitution in America. Many have studied the problems surrounding female
prostitution and have found just how troubling the conditions are for these
women. While it is difficult to find reliable data regarding prostitution, some
reports show that, of street prostitutes, 65 to 75% are victims of long-term incest.1
Of all prostitutes, 75 to 90% were sexually abused during childhood,2 and 85% of
prostitutes working in the United States are addicted to crack, heroin,
prescription drugs, or alcohol.3 Working the street is a bleak prospect for women,
according to Dr. Joyce I. Wallace, the founder of From Our Streets with Dignity
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(an organization which offers free services to women who are often defined as
prostitutes in New York City). “Half the time, they’re on the street because they
had a drug problem and got thrown out of whatever homes they came from, . . .
[b]ut half are on the street because it’s less violent than home. They turn to drugs
to make life tolerable.”4 Academic work on the plight of female prostitutes has
been extensive.5
But women are not the sole purveyors of sexual services in America or the
world. Men throughout history have also offered up their bodies for money, with
some academics positing that ever since women have solicited, so have men.6
Ancient Greek acceptance of the practice is well documented, and it was even
licensed and taxed in Augustinian Rome.7 Despite this prevalence, even if male
prostitution has occurred on a less grandiose scale to its female counterpart,
“social inquiry has been largely limited to women servicing men.”8
My purpose in this note is threefold: first, to examine the history and
present-day social status of male sex workers and the academic understanding
thereof; second, to analyze whether historical legislation targeting female
prostitution would, in fact, have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as it stands today had
the statutes remained in their gendered forms; and finally, to assess whether
today’s current prostitution law enforcement policies, though couched in
generally gender neutral language, in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause
because of law enforcement’s insistence on almost the exclusive targeting of
women for the crime of prostitution. While arguments can be made both for and
against Equal Protection violation, the existence of the dispute itself brings to
light a number of worthwhile questions about the nature of prostitution at large
and the way we as a society choose to prosecute and deter individuals from
engaging in it. At the same time, the nature of male prostitution as a nearexclusively same-sex exchange affects the comparison itself, as female-male
encounters carry their own set of issues.9
Ultimately, I conclude that in order to best protect the interests of both men
and women, these anti-prostitution statutes must be enforced against both sexes.
By only prosecuting women, we are stating that differences exist where in fact
they may not. Stating these differences harms women by forcing them to view
themselves as weak and in need of protection, while simultaneously pushing
male sex workers to believe they should be able to help themselves in a
potentially dangerous situation. While selective enforcement of these laws might
be constitutional, we would do well to reexamine the idea of “real” differences in
the hopes of lessening discrimination, as well as gender stereotyping, against

4. Christopher S. Wren, Life Gets Harder on the Already Mean Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at
B3 (quoting Dr. Joyce I. Wallace, founder of Frost’d a non-profit organization that helps prostitutes).
5. See, e.g., R. BARRI FLOWERS, THE PROSTITUTION OF WOMEN AND GIRLS (1998).
6. DONALD J. WEST, MALE PROSTITUTION ix (1993).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See J. Marlowe, It’s Different for Boys, in WHORES AND OTHER FEMINISTS 141 (Jill Nagle ed.,
1997) (considering the heteronormative boundaries confronted in female-male exchanges).
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both men and women.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MALE PROSTITUTION10
The existence of male sex work dates back to antiquity. The
relationship
between the male sex worker and his society has varied across time and cultures.
In Ancient Athens, an adult male prostitute was treated as a second class citizen
and had no political rights, while his clients remained full fledged citizens.11
Adult prostitution existed simultaneously with a more youthful counterpart, and
Rome had many boys’ brothels where men could seek sexual services from other
men and boys.12 The street-walking youth sex workers also had their place,
“lifting their tunics to show off their genitals and entice potential clients.”13
There was a similar delineation between prostitutes and their clients in the
Arab world as well. The receiving (penetrated) sex worker was thought of as the
disordered and dishonorable member of the pairing, while the active
(penetrating) client was able to maintain his status as virile and masculine by
avoiding playing the part of the penetrated, woman-like figure.14
This seemed to also be true in the European world prior to the arrival of
Christianity. As Christianity established itself, along with its strict condemnation
of homosexual acts, male prostitution continued to exist, although discretely,
operating within the still functioning bathhouses of the Middle Ages.15 Further,
historian Vern L. Bullough has documented the existence of male prostitution in
the Americas prior to the arrival of Western explorers.16 Colonization did not
stop this spread; as Western peoples and ideals moved across America, male
brothels sprung up in metropolises all the way to the Pacific.17
10. For purposes of this note, I will be using the term “prostitution” as defined by The New
Oxford American Dictionary as “The practice or occupation of engaging in sexual activity with
someone for payment.” THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1369 (ELIZABETH J. JEWELL &
FRANK R. ABATE eds., 2001) (JW, Rule 15). This definition includes street solicitation for sexual acts,
stripping, as well as escort services and erotic massage. Id. Though a prostitute (I will use the term
sex worker going forward, as the term “prostitute” carries its own discursive burden) may participate
in only some and not all activities, the full range of sexual services offered by sex workers which fall
under the traditional legislative definition of prostitution requires a broad reading of the term.
Additionally, I have chosen to limit myself to male-male exchanges, rather than address femalefemale exchanges as well, due to the fact that the literature in same sex interactions is also segregated
this way. The issues surrounding male-male interactions may indeed be similar to those of femalefemale interactions, but in order to focus the scope of my paper, I have chosen not to address the
similarities and differences, instead limiting myself to male same sex exchanges.
11. MICHEL DORAIS, RENT BOYS: THE WORLD OF MALE SEX WORKERS 13 (Peter Feldstein trans.,
2005).
12. See id. at 14 (discussing the existence of brothels in Rome where young men “offered their
charms with a modicum of discretion.”).
13. Id.
14. Jayesh Needham, After the Arab Spring: A New Opportunity for LGBT Human Rights
Advocacy?, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 101, 110 (2013).
15. See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 14 (discussing the condemnation of homosexuals in the church).
16. See VERN L. BULLOUGH, SEXUAL VARIANCE IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY 45 (1976) (detailing the
existence of prostitution in South and Central America prior to Westernization).
17. See ROBIN LLOYD, FOR MONEY OR LOVE: BOY PROSTITUTION IN AMERICA 74-75 (1976) (“San
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Prior to the 20th century and the formulation of the modern
heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy,18 same-sex sexual encounters were largely
considered acceptable for the penetrating or active partner (if not in society at
large, then at least within the confines of the active partner’s own selfperception). Conversely, the penetrated, receiving, or passive partner (and often
sex worker) was frequently regarded as effeminate and distasteful.19
In fact, the discourse surrounding male prostitution itself was largely
intertwined with discussions of homosexuality at large, in that it was not until
discussions about homosexuality as an identity entered the discourse that male
prostitution was considered equivalent to female prostitution. While evidence
exists that male prostitution in London frequently occurred as early as the 18th
century, “such behavior was often not recognised as prostitution. No distinction
emerged during this period to distinguish same-sex desire from commercial
sexual activity involving males, both being conflated and assumed to be
indistinguishable.”20 In other words, male prostitution as an equivalent to female
prostitution did not exist because gay desire did not exist in the public’s mind.
The situation, prior to this hetero/homosexual conceptual turn in the early 20th
century, is described by LGBT historian George Chauncey as one wherein “the
predominant form of male prostitution seems to have involved fairies selling sex
to men who, despite the declaration of desire made by their willingness to pay
for the encounters, identified themselves as normal.”21 These clients did not yet
need to confront any questioning of their “sexuality” as such, because in
maintaining their role as a penetrator, they were allowed to retain their
masculinity, heterosexuality, and thus avoid the pitfalls created in occupying the
passive role of the prostitute. The sex worker himself did not need to confront his
own sexuality, as it was conceptually tied up in his profession; as the passive
partner, he was defined simply as a male prostitute without the need for a
further homosexual identity and the ensuing examination of real desire. These
distinctions in how a society, and the individual participant himself, think about
male prostitution are important for the later discussion of whether there exist
real differences in male prostitution vis-à-vis female prostitution.22
Whether we frame male-male exchanges as homosexual activity or as
simply the exploitation of impoverished, young, heterosexual men may help
determine if a legitimate and avoidable social harm exists in male-male
exchanges. It ultimately becomes a question of whether the presence of desire
affects the way social harm is framed. If we deem these men homosexual, we
then inevitably open the door to the sex worker actually enjoying the exchange.
If so, does this enjoyment remove the risk of the social harms, including
degradation, to a straight man engaging in male-male sexual conduct as a means
of financial necessity? Ultimately, in asking if these harms are removed by the

Francisco got off to an early start in the boy business, also in the late 1800’s, during the Gold Rush.”).
18. See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 15.
19. See id.
20. John Scott, A Prostitute’s Progress: Male Prostitution in Scientific Discourse, 13 SOC. SEMIOTICS
179, 181 (2003).
21. DORAIS, supra note 11, at 15 (quoting GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK (1994)).
22. See discussion infra Part V.
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presence of desire, we are confronting whether we can treat male-male sexual
commodification differently from female-male exchanges, which we seem to
believe has more obvious social harms. But, taking desire into account in this
way exposes the inconsistency in how we weigh desire in a female-male
exchange, where no one asks if the woman is enjoying herself as a means to
either mitigate or heighten the level of harm to both the sex worker and society.
It seems that desire should play no part in assessing these harms, and yet from a
practical standpoint, society has largely tied up the question of the existence of
homosexual desire with whether or not a harm exists in male-male sexual
exchanges.
The image of the poor, often exploited, young male as the face of male
prostitution came into prominence in the academic and popular mindset in the
middle of the 20th century.23 Scott describes the way in which male prostitutes
were depicted:
Male prostitutes came to be depicted as young, innocent victims of older,
predatory perverts:
During this period it was understood to be the duty of the law and agencies of
enforcement to protect ‘ignorant’ young males from the ‘unnatural lusts’ of older
men . . . Increasingly, young males involved in prostitution were portrayed as
weak and lacking in judgment. . .they were not automatically classified as
‘homosexuals.’24

Dorais identifies the destitute nature of young male runaways as the driving
force for many young men engaging in same-sex prostitution in the Americas.25
These young men may have viewed engaging in same-sex sexual acts as a last
resort, or perhaps as simply a chance at relatively easy money.26 Because the
hetero/homosexual identity dichotomy had not yet emerged in public thought,
this definition was the only way to explain the existence of male-male exchanges.
The sex worker was simply destitute, and the older, wealthier pervert preyed
upon that need. Whether this was in fact the case is unclear. A homosexual
identity was still incredibly difficult to assert, and many of these young men
could have simply been acting according to their desires, entirely contradicting
then the popular depiction of coercion and extortion.
Nonetheless, this framing of the young, exploited male allowed young men
to engage in homosexual conduct without taking on the condemning social label
of “homosexual.” This classification, in turn, presumably made public discourse
about the subject of male prostitution less uncomfortable. Framing the issue as
one in which laws were passed to prevent poor, straight men from being forced
to engage in same-sex prostitution as a means to survive was much less taboo
than discussing homosexuality and deviancy for their own sake.
But with the post-World War II shift in the “way in which sexual behaviour

23. Scott, supra note 20, at 183.
24. Id. (citing JEFFREY WEEKS, AGAINST NATURE: ESSAYS ON HISTORY, SEXUALITY AND IDENTITY
(1991); GARRY WOTHERSPOON, CITY OF THE PLAIN: HISTORY OF A GAY SUBCULTURE (1991)).
25. See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 15.
26. Id. at 15-16.
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was understood and governed”27 came a change in the perception of male-male
sexual contact, allowing for the start of a popular acceptance of homosexuality as
an identity rather than a disorder. Kinsey’s reports on human sexuality (1948,
1965)offered a “‘liberal’ re-interpretation of human sexual behaviour,” and
“dispensed with earlier static readings of sexual behaviour in favour of a more
fluid reading.”28 Scott explains during this same time period:
[a] wide variety of social scientific texts of the period mark[ed] adolescence out
as a phase of life imbued with great socio-sexual significance. . .Adolescence
came to be viewed as a problem of governance, particularly in relation to
‘normal’ sexual development and functioning. Adolescence was identified as the
site in which sexual identification and desire developed, where life-long sexual
habits formed, and were [sic] the ‘truth’ of sexual orientation revealed itself.29

This new view of adolescent sexuality, which perhaps included a broader
view of homosexuality itself, presented a new problem for the way that society
viewed the issue of the young, male sex worker. While the view of the male sex
worker as a young, heterosexual man was in force in the 1950s and 60s, “[w]hat
rendered male prostitution a governmental problem was the idea that such men
[‘heterosexual’ male prostitutes] could be ‘treated’ through practical welfare or
medical interventions.”30 In this way, society was able to incorporate the
emerging idea that homosexual acts equated to a homosexual desire into its
depiction of the stereotypical male sex worker. But rather than label the male
prostitute as a homosexual, the prostitute needed instead only to be “treated” so
as to avoid falling into homosexuality.
By defining homosexual desire as a treatable disease, and by characterizing
male sex workers as homosexuals motivated by poverty, (with the fear that
repeating sexual acts would in itself lead to homosexual desire, or was
symptomatic of a disordered desire31), the public discourse surrounding male
prostitution was kept decidedly within the moorings of preventing public harms.
Scott summarizes a startling depiction of a 19-year-old, white, male homosexual,
written by Dr. Freyhan, a clinical psychologist, in the 1947 issue of The Delaware
State Medical Journal:
The patient, identified by Freyhan as a male prostitute, was said to have adopted
an ‘aggressive’ homosexuality; that is, he self-identified as homosexual. A
teacher’s report (included in the study uncritically as evidence) noted that the
patient’s homosexuality was not of the type normally found in pubescent boys
and girls, the patient having pursued other males and ‘persuaded’ them to use
him as a ‘passive’ partner in sexual relations. It was also noted that at one
institution, in which the patient had previously spent time for committing a petty
crime, he had corrupted other boys to the extent that he was placed in separate

27. Scott, supra note 20, at 183.
28. Id. (citing Alfred C. Kinsey et al., Sexual Behaviour in the Human Male (1948); Alfred C.
Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953)).
29. Scott, supra note 20, at 184. (citing C.M. FLEMING, ADOLESCENCE: ITS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1948); ELIZABETH B. HURLOCK, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT (1949); RUDOLPH M. WITTENBERG,
ADOLESCENCE AND DISCIPLINE: A MENTAL HYGIENE PRIMER (1959)).
30. Scott, supra note 20, at 184.
31. See id.

T. Stoddard - PARTNER EDIT TWO (Do Not Delete)

2/18/2014 11:35 AM

MALE PROSTITUTION & EQUAL PROTECTION

233

sleeping quarters. Moreover, when he had been arrested by police (not initially
for prostitution, but for wearing a naval uniform in an unauthorised manner) he
confessed to police that he had been ‘frilled’ engaging in the pursuit of young
soldiers and sailors, Freyhan conclude[ed] that he was ‘proud’ of his ability to
attract other men. Freyhan . . . went on to point out that the absence of any kind
of self-criticism and inner conflict in the patient ‘proved to be a severe obstacle to
psychotherapy’, being symptomatic of a psychopathic personality make-up. “As
such he concluded that lobotomy was the only option left open for ‘treatment’
that could curtail the patient’s current behaviour.”32

The young man’s apparent homosexuality is framed in terms of disorder
and perversity, describing him as deviant in spite of the fact that he was
probably only pursuing the same kinds of sexual liaisons with men that a
heterosexual male would seek from his female peers.
With subsequent progress in the gay rights movement and growing public
acceptance of homosexuality, a slow but growing acceptance of the gay identity
of male sex workers emerged in the academic literature of the 1980s and 90s.33
Male sex workers were described “as individuals, varied in character but usually
gay, as much in need of friendship and sexual love as other young people, but
who happen to have chosen prostitution as a temporary method of surviving in
impoverished social circumstances.”34 Donald West, who has studied and
written extensively about male prostitution, imagined a potential counterpart to
the young, poor, and now gay, male sex worker, describing a “young,
promiscuously inclined homosexual who finds occasional prostitution a
congenial and profitable activity, one that brings him into contact with
interesting people . . . and an exciting lifestyle,” but notes that at the time of his
writing, “[o]nly exceptionally has published research ventured beyond the fulltime street prostitute [and presumably the prostitute more aligned with the poorheterosexual model].”35
Recent research by Michel Dorais, a professor at McGill University, has
confirmed that there are indeed numerous backgrounds from which male sex
workers hail. Through his analysis of forty accounts taken from interviews with
current and recently retired male sex workers, he has outlined four “typical life
patterns” within which his subjects could be classified.36
Dorais classified his first group, comprising twenty-two of his forty
respondents, as “outcasts.”37 Their living situation was marked by “dire
poverty,” “substance abuse,” “the group comprising all confirmed cases of HIV
transmission,” “the earliest entrants into the sex trade . . . half of them before the
age of sixteen,” and the group including the “largest number of sexual abuse
victims.”38 This group most closely maps onto the now-traditional view of male

32. Id.
33. See WEST, supra note 6, at xi-xii (discussing recent literature as being markedly different from
the image of male prostitution displayed in literature prior to gay liberation).
34. Id. at xii.
35. Id. at xiii.
36. DORAIS, supra note 11, at 36.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 36-38.
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sex workers as predominately young, impoverished, abused, and suffering from
addiction, and also happens to most closely mirror the stereotypical female,
street-soliciting, sex worker. Additionally, twenty out of the twenty-two
“outcasts” “were or had previously been street hustling on a regular (in most
cases daily) basis; only a few had worked at any time in stripping or escorting.”39
These “outcasts” report very low levels of self-esteem, viewing themselves as
worthless due to their need to pursue sex work to meet their monetary needs.40
In short, the majority of Dorais’ subjects do in fact map onto the image of male
sex worker as driven to sex work because of poverty, addiction, and abuse, and
thus seem to have the most to gain from laws outlawing male prostitution.41
Dorais divides the remaining half of the respondents into three other
categories. While each category is not mutually exclusive of the others, as some
respondents had experienced multiple categories throughout their time as sex
workers, Dorais notes that usually respondents have a predominant pattern.42
The second group he deems “part-timers” who work as sex-workers to
“make ends meet” while maintaining another job.43 “Part-timers” entered sex
work between the ages of twenty-two and forty, a later age than men in other
categories, and worked primarily as strippers if heterosexual, or escorts if
homosexual.44 These men, due to the reputational costs of having a “real” job and
due to some of them identifying as homosexual, tend to keep their work discreet;
they often garner some degree of self-affirmation from their work, and an overall
level of self-esteem, in contrast with the “outcasts”.45
The third group is made up of “insiders,” or “young men who have grown
up in or around the sex trade to the point that they come to view it as their
primary social circle.”46 These men do not view sex work as a last resort, but as
“something natural, an honourable living.”47 These men also entered the sex
trade at an early age, between fifteen and twenty-one, but unlike the “outcasts”
they maintain a positive self-image and have relatively stable friendships and
relationships.48

39. Id. at 38.
40. Id. at 37-38.
41. If we accept the view that laws banning prostitution benefit those who stand to gain most
monetarily, the very poor. Removing prostitution as a possible avenue of employment benefits them,
as in so banning, we affirm the social value of sex as something that is de-valued through the
commodification thereof, and refuse to allow their commoditized sex to dehumanize them. This
argument has of course been questioned by many academics, but I will refrain from critiquing it, if
only because for purposes of constitutional analysis, the proposed governmental interest in
promoting sex between consenting adults free from the possibly coercive effects of poverty that lead
to selling sexual services would clearly withstand even the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis
review.
42. DORAIS, supra note 11, at 38-39.
43. Id. at 39.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 39-40.
46. Id. at 40.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 40-41. (4.1)
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The final group Dorais terms “liberationists,” “for whom prostitution is a
way of living out fantasies, exploring new experiences and partners, and
profiting from these discoveries.”49 This group maps most closely to West’s
vision of the “young, promiscuously inclined, homosexual.”50 Dorais argues that
this group most challenges preconceived notions of male prostitution, since for
these men, the work “has the potential to be gratifying and affirming under the
right circumstances and with the right clients.”51 These men had, on average,
higher levels of education than men from other groups, and viewed sex work as
an “opportunity to affirm their sexual orientation or preference and to grow as
an individual.”52 Men from this group also seem to present the most cogent
argument for differing treatment of male and female sex workers, as they do not
seem in need of any of the social protections that banning prostitution promises.
Instead, this group could be seen as providing a social good of sorts, a sexual
service to those men incapable of finding a consenting partner, while
simultaneously reaping a monetary reward without the costs to self that are
associated with the “outcast” class.
In summary, the history of male prostitution is one in which Western
society has done its best to ingrain heteronormative ideas of dominant-masculine
and submissive-feminine identities onto the client and sex worker respectively.
With this mapping came the assumption that the male sex worker, as a genetic
male and naturally dominant being, is forced into sex work due to poverty,
abuse, addiction, and other circumstances, all falling within the “outcast”
category, and will subsequently experience depression and low self-esteem. The
existence of the “part-timer,” the “insider,” and the “liberationist,” each in his
own way freed from the traditional concerns of drug abuse and poverty that
plague the “outcast,” challenges the strict mapping of the equivalence of femalemale and male-male sex work, which I will further explore through the analysis
of the laws and enforcement policies of the government vis-à-vis the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER CLASSIFICATIONS
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.53

The Fourteenth Amendment was introduced by the Reconstruction
Congress in the wake of the Civil War to protect the newly granted citizenship
rights of freed black slaves from explicitly discriminatory legislation in

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 41.
See WEST, supra note 6, at xiii.
DORAIS, supra note 11, at 43.
Id. at 41-42.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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previously Confederate states.54 This new amendment was quickly tested in the
Slaughter-House Cases, in which the Supreme Court drastically limited the scope
of the amendment’s privileges and immunities clause, essentially stating that it
“did not provide general federal protection for citizens against state regulation.
Rather, it protected only a few rights, ‘which ow[e] their existence to the Federal
government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.’”55
The day after deciding the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court used
its newly minted rule of protecting only those rights owing their existence to the
Federal government in Bradwell v. Illinois, and in so doing, began to outline the
Court’s eventual approach to “real” differences between the sexes.56 In Bradwell,
the Court upheld an Illinois statute that refused to license a woman as a lawyer,
holding “that the right to practice law was not a privilege or immunity of
national citizenship and therefore was not protected by the fourteenth
amendment.”57 While Justice Bradley dissented in the Slaughter-House Cases,
arguing that “a law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a
lawful [employment deprives] them of liberty as well as property, without due
process of law,”58 he articulated what would later become the “real difference”
doctrine when he wrote in Bradwell:
[the] natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to
the domain and functions of womanhood.59

Justice Bradley’s words, though now 140 years out of date, shows the
troubling beginnings of the Supreme Court’s thinking in regards to gender
distinctions. By creating differing spheres for men and women, the Court began
to blaze a dangerous path that would allow some discrimination on the basis of
gender, if not through application of antiquated norms of motherhood and
family due to the application of patriarchal and heteronormative thinking
channeled through language of biological “real” differences.
The Court finally changed its stance on gender discrimination in the 1970s,
first with Reed v. Reed.60 The case involved an Idaho statute governing the estates
of persons who died intestate, granting a preference to men over women as
administrators by, specifically stating that “of several persons claiming and
equally entitled to administer, males must be preferred to females.”61 The Court
issued a unanimous opinion that the statute in question violated the Equal

54.
1868).
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 452 (6th ed. 2009) (ratified on July 28,
Id. at 453 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1873)).
See generally Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 619.
Id. at 619-20 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 122).
Id. at 620 (quoting Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141).
See 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1977).
Id. at 72 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (repealed 1972)).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 Chief Justice Berger, writing
for the majority, wrote that the relevant standard to be applied to gender
classifications was “whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants
[bears] a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by
the operation of [the statute].”63 The State argued that the classification provided
for the distinction and appointment of an administrator when presented with
two equal candidates only differing in gender. The Court rejected this as “the
very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause.”64
The Reed Court asserted that it was applying a rational basis test to gender.65
As such, the decision, while indeed a move to protect women, is somewhat
troubling from a doctrinal sense. Under normal rational basis review, with its
high level of deference, a statutory provision must be “rationally related” to a
“legitimate” government interest,66 and a “legitimate interest” need only be a
hypothetical one, not one actually articulated by the government at the time of
passing the suspect law.67 Using regular rational basis, it would seem that
Idaho’s need to distinguish between persons, and the use of this gendered
methodology, would probably be allowed.
The Court began to move away from the application of rational basis review
in Frontiero v. Richardson.68 The challenged statute was a federal law under which
“a male member of the uniformed armed services could automatically claim his
spouse as a dependent . . . [whereas] a female service member could claim
comparable benefits only if she demonstrated that her spouse was in fact
dependent on her for over half his support.”69 Though the Court was unable to
author a majority opinion, eight of the justices agreed that the law violated the
Equal Protection Clause.70 Writing for four of the justices, Justice Brennan argued
that like racial classifications, gender distinctions should similarly receive
heightened scrutiny.71 Brennan noted that many “stereotyped distinctions” are
present in many statutes, and justified heighted scrutiny by acknowledging that
“the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or
contribute to society.”72 Justice Powell wrote a concurrence, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, wherein he expressly rejected the need to
apply a heightened classification to gender, arguing that it was not necessary to

62. Reed, 404 U.S. at 74.
63. STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 621 (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 76).
64. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
65. See id.
66. See United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938) (defining and
applying the standard for normal rational basis review).
67. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 641 (17th ed. 2010)
(“Such [rationality] review does not demand anything approaching a perfect fit to an actual purpose;
any conceivably rational basis is enough.”).
68. See generally 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion).
69. STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 622.
70. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 688.
72. Id. at 686.
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decide what level of scrutiny gender classifications warranted in light of Reed’s
use of rational basis and the similarly groundless discrimination in Frontiero.73
While Justice Brennan’s opinion did make progress, acknowledging the longsuffered discrimination against women that existed in statutes, his caveat that
such distinctions “frequently” do not bear any relation to ability is still troubling,
because it allowed for the later doctrine of “real differences” to develop around
what many would argue are differences, based only in slightly less offensive
traditions of the female as a disadvantaged gender.
In Craig v. Boren, the Court finally adopted intermediate scrutiny as we
know it today.74 An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 3.2% alcohol beer to
men under the age of 21, but to women under the age of 18.75 The question was
“whether such a gender-based differential constitute[d] a denial to males 18-20
years of age of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”76 Justice Brennan articulated the new test, intermediate scrutiny,
as one where “classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives,”
clarifying that the statute must be “substantially related to achievement of the
statutory objective.”77 Oklahoma argued that the statute enhanced traffic safety,
showing statistical evidence that more men aged 18-20 were arrested for drunk
driving than women of the same age.78 But the Court found that the statute’s use
of gender to prevent a marginal difference in drunk driving incidents was “an
unduly tenuous ‘fit,’” and that “the showing offered by the appellees [the
legislature] does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for
the regulation of drinking and driving.”79 It is somewhat ironic, through perhaps
not surprising, that the intermediate scrutiny test emerged out of a law that
discriminated against men; nevertheless, this test has become the Court’s
approach to gender distinctions in law.
But intermediate scrutiny, with its test of “substantially related” to
“important objectives,” is not the same as strict scrutiny’s test that there must be
a “compelling governmental interest” to which purpose the statute is “narrowly
tailored”, and also constitutes the “least restrictive means” for achieving that
purpose.80 “Important objectives” are doubtless different from “compelling
interests,” as is “substantially related” different from “narrowly tailored” and
“least restrictive.” In practice, this has led the Court to allow some separate but
equal treatment of men and women, as well as acknowledge real and inherent
differences between the two.
In United States v. Virginia (the Virginia Military Institute case), the Court

73. See id. at 691-92.
74. See 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976).
75. Id. at 197.
76. Id. at 192.
77. Id. at 197, 204.
78. See id. at 225 (showing that 2% of men, compared to only .18% of women, aged 18-20 are
arrested for drunk driving).
79. Id. at 202, 204.
80. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 702 (2007)
(describing the strict scrutiny test applied to matters concerning race).
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struck down the Virginia Military Institute’s (VMI) policy of only admitting
men.81 The case is particularly instructive in the way it outlines acceptable
governmental purposes for treating men and women differently, as well as the
burden of the state in defending these distinctions. Justice Ginsberg, writing for
the majority, arguably strengthens the intermediate scrutiny test, explaining that
the government must have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its action
and that the “burden of justification is demanding” and “rests entirely on the
State.”82 The Court clarifies that it believes there are differences at play between
men and women:
Supposed “inherent differences” are no longer accepted as a ground for race or
national origin classifications. . .Physical differences between men and women,
however, are enduring. . . “Inherent differences” between men and women, we
have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s
opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women “for
particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promote equal
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation’s people. “But such classifications may not be used, as
they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women.”83

The Court first found that the all female program of VMI’s sister school the
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership did not offer an equivalent education
to that of VMI (which would presumably have provided an acceptable reason for
either school to deny admittance on the basis of gender).84 Next, the Court found
that the differences of sex, which would require alterations necessary to ensure
privacy, did not justify excluding women from admission (i.e. that the physical
requirements imposed by VMI’s style of education were not too much for a
woman to bear).85
The Court has, however, upheld a few gender-based classifications, even
under the intermediate scrutiny test. In Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior
Court, “the Court upheld a statute defining statutory rape as ‘an act of sexual
intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where
the female is under the age of 18 years.’”86 The Court reasoned that the State’s
interest in preventing illegitimate pregnancies was a strong one, and that
“punish[ing] only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the
consequences of his conduct,” was well within the legislature’s purview,
especially when “the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence
to young females.”87

81. 518 U.S. 515, 519, 558 (1996).
82. Id. at 524, 533 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724).
83. Virginia Military Institute Case, 518 U.S. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467
(1948)).
84. See Virginia Military Institute Case, 518 U.S. at 534.
85. See id. at 534, 551, 558.
86. STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 647 (quoting Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty.,
450 U.S. 464, 466 (1981)).
87. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464-65, 473.
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Similarly, in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Services, the Court
upheld a federal law requiring that the child of a male U.S. citizen born abroad
must file more documentation of parentage to gain citizenship than if the mother
of the child were a U.S. citizen.88 The governmental interest at issue was “the
importance of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists.”89 In the
case of the mother, the relation “is verifiable from the birth itself.”90 Nguyen
seems less offensive as an example of “real differences” as it is indeed much
easier to establish maternity than paternity given the fact that the woman must
give birth. But Michael M.’s reasoning is a bit more troubling. While the state may
indeed have an interest in deterring illegitimate pregnancies, is it enough of a
real difference to justify criminalizing the male behavior? Yes, a child is a
significant burden, but to equate the burden of a child to the burden of carrying a
criminal rape conviction seems disproportionate. Again, the Court seems to feel
the need to protect stereotypically weak women from the lusts of young men,
and does so by over-punishing the male partner who may have been equally, or
even less, responsible for the sexual episode.
Regardless, this line of thinking about “real differences” in Equal Protection
cases dealing with gender is a difficult subject. Returning to the power of societal
discourse itself, Catherine MacKinnon has written that accepting these “real
differences” may in fact support male domination of society: The idea of gender
difference helps keep the reality of male dominance in place. . . Difference is the
velvet glove on the iron fist of domination. This is as true when differences are
affirmed as when they are denied, when their substance is applauded or when it
is disparaged, when women are punished or [when] they are protected in their
name. A sex inequality is not a difference gone wrong, a lesson the law of sex
discrimination has yet to learn. One of the most deceptive anti-feminisms in
society, scholarship, politics, and law is the persistent treatment of gender as if it
truly is a question of difference, rather than treating the gender difference as a
construct of the difference gender makes.91

In short, by making distinctions of any sort, women are inherently kept
separate, and are thus subjugated, to male dominance. Even measures which
would seek to protect women inherently associate femininity with weakness.
Acknowledging differences of any sort opens the door for comparison, and in
that comparison, women usually lose.
There are several cases in which the acknowledgement of “differences” is
clearly suspect. In Kahn v. Shevin, the Court upheld a property tax exemption for
widows but not for widowers on the grounds that there are greater financial
difficulties confronting a lone woman than there are a lone man.92 Similarly, in
Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Court upheld a Naval policy giving women more time
to achieve a mandatory promotion before being discharged, arguing that
remedial measures that advantage women who have been historically

88.
89.
90.
91.

See 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 54.
STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 652 (quoting CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3, 8-9 (1987)).
92. 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974).

T. Stoddard - PARTNER EDIT TWO (Do Not Delete)

2/18/2014 11:35 AM

MALE PROSTITUTION & EQUAL PROTECTION

241

disadvantaged are permissible.93 In both of these cases the Court implied, if it did
not directly state, that women in society confront more problems in the
workforce, struggling to make money and to be successful in a male dominated
world. But rather than insist on the equality of the sexes and rule these two laws
unconstitutional, the Court instead believed itself to be helping women to catch
up. What they were perhaps failing to consider is MacKinnon’s argument that by
acknowledging some differences, we are simply reinforcing and retrenching the
inequality that we seek to stamp out, and perhaps even seeing difference
through the lens of male dominance and patriarchy where none exists.
By legally allowing for some “real” differences, we as a society may in fact
be reinforcing older, discriminatory stereotypes both about the nature of
heterosexual sex and about homosexual interactions as well. MacKinnon’s
argument can easily extend into the problems that we might see when
comparing past legislation, which often directly targeted only male-female sex
work by only criminalizing opposite-sex interactions rather than same-sex
interaction. In addition, many more resources of today’s police departments are
used to stop opposite-sex rather than same-sex sex work. By calling the two
types of interactions “different” on the basis of gender, we inherently read in
weakness to the woman in the female-male interaction, and a strength and lack
of public protection for the male sex worker engaged in same sex exchanges.
III. LEGISLATIVE DISCRIMINATION IN THE PAST
It is clear that some states conceived of homosexual interactions as
occurring completely outside the context of traditional sex work and
prostitution, instead using the discourse of non-naturality to stigmatize
homosexual conduct as disordered and criminal behavior. Historically, antiprostitution laws were frequently written so as only to target opposite-sex
interactions, leaving same-sex interaction to anti-sodomy statutes, but without
the stigma of the “prostitution” label. These laws sought only to target the
traditional opposite-sex interactions that comfortably fit within a
heteronormative model of sexual behavior, leaving the possibility of homosexual
sex for pay completely outside the criminal label of “prostitution.” While this
perhaps gave male prostitutes an advantage by removing them from the criminal
penalties associated with prostitution, it doubtless left them subject to the
harsher penalties of these “unnatural acts” statutes, which were much harsher.
Many of these statutes were on the books until relatively recently. For
example, in Mississippi, only procuring female prostitutes was covered, with a
recommended penalty of six-months in prison for the crime (by either a party
looking to sell or buy).94 By contrast, homosexual interactions, whether for pay or
merely consensual, are covered under Mississippi’s “unnatural intercourse”
statute, which carries a hefty ten-year penalty for both parties.95 While Lawrence
v. Texas96 doubtless made the latter “unnatural intercourse” statute

93.
94.
95.
96.

See 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-51, 53 (1972).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (West 2013).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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unconstitutional, the offending statute is still present in the Mississippi code.
Louisiana similarly worded their prostitution statute, writing:
Prostitution is the practice by a female of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with
males for compensation.
Whoever commits the crime of prostitution shall be fined not more than one
hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.97

This statute, as later construed by law enforcement and the court system of
Louisiana, explicitly excludes men from the profession, and the relatively lax
punishment, leaving them subject to other statutes with much harsher
sentences.98
These laws criminalizing only opposite-sex sex work were also upheld as
constitutional despite cries that they violated the Equal Protection Clause. In
State v. Devall, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the federal
constitutionality of the above-referenced statute.99 The court itself acknowledged
that the challenged statute only criminalized the selling of sex by women (to
either female or male clients).100 While this court was operating without the
intermediate scrutiny standard laid out in Craig v. Boren, Frontiero v. Richardson
had already been decided, and with it the move towards including gender as a
protected class. But because no majority had emerged in Frontiero, the Louisiana
Supreme Court used a rational basis analysis in examining the constitutionality
of the law.101 The court acknowledged Reed, but limited its impact to only
disallowing the use of gender to eliminate a class from consideration for a
benefit.102 They instead cited to Goesaert v. Cleary, a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1948.103 In Goesaert, the Court upheld a Michigan statute which
denied women bartending licenses unless they were the wife or daughter of the
male owner of a tavern.104 The Louisiana court summarized the import of the
case by writing that “a statute may make a distinction without violating the
constitutional guarantee, if the classification is a natural and reasonable one.”105
The court found that the defendant had not presented any evidence to show that
“male prostitution is a social problem of any importance” and “[t]he Constitution
does not and should not require the legislature, before attempting to regulate an
existing practice which is detrimental to the public welfare, to regulate a practice
which is not.”106
The court reveals a distinct bias in these statements. First, the court assumes
that it is “natural and reasonable” to classify women as the class more likely to
97. State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909, 910 (La. 1974) (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:82, as it
appeared in 1974).
98. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (1974) (amended 2013).
99. See Devall, 302 So. 2d at 910.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 912-13.
102. Id. at 912.
103. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
104. See id. at 467.
105. Devall, 302 So. 2d at 911. (citing Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 468).
106. Id. at 912.
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engage in prostitution, without offering any reasons for that assumption other
than perhaps some commonly held, but mistaken, social knowledge. But the
second statement reveals that this assumption runs even deeper to the point that
the court cannot imagine that male sex work occurs absent a concrete showing by
the defendant of its existence. While the burden to overcome rational basis
review doubtlessly rested on the defendant to demonstrate that male prostitution
was not merely a theoretical matter, the language of the court begs the question:
how much data would be enough to lift the issue of male sex work to a “social
problem of any importance” such that the court would feel it had to intervene?
The court concludes with this statement:
[A]bsent a showing that distinctions involving prostitution are merely pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other [and thus trigger the sort of Equal Protection offered post-Reed],
lawmakers are constitutionally free to exclude male prostitution from the
coverage of legislation on the reasonable basis that it does not constitute a social
problem. Differences between the sexes does bear a rational relationship to the
prohibition of prostitution by females.107

In this decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court not only upheld a gendered
version of the state anti-prostitution statute against equal protection violation, it
also confirmed the contemporary societal view of male, and most often malemale sex work as something completely outside the heteronormative model of
the traditional heterosexual prostitution exchange. To recognize that same-sex
interactions occur frequently would place the court in the uncomfortable position
of admitting homosexual sex workers into the definitional ranks of prostitutes at
large.
In much the same way that some conservatives fear that allowing gay
marriage will mar the term “marriage” for opposite-sex couples, admitting
homosexual men into the category “prostitute” could be seen as equally altering
the definition of prostitution itself. Admittedly, “marriage” has usually been a
positive term in society, whereas “prostitute” has carried a negative burden, but
one which homosexuals were denied to carry even if they wanted it. To
acknowledge male sex workers would be to acknowledge, and legitimate
through discourse, the existence of homosexuality, or taken to a lesser extreme,
the existence of men forced into selling sex in order to survive. To admit the
former into the term “prostitute” could remove the disordered connotation,
because while some female sex workers are doubtless seen as in need of mental
help, the profession also includes semi-respectable call women trying to earn a
living. To admit the poor heterosexual male forced into same-sex exchanges into
the category could be seen as removing the stigma from gay-for-pay interactions
by giving it the valid, though admittedly still stigmatized, label of prostitution
rather than that of “unnatural act.”
While the Louisiana Supreme Court probably did not consciously
acknowledge the meaning of its assumptions, analyzing them reveals that, at
least in Louisiana in the 1970s, little progress was being made both in terms of
acknowledging the existence of male sex workers, nor in granting homosexuality

107.

Id. at 912-13.
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any sort of label which would grant it an equivalent social status even to
“prostitution.” And while the justice system might like to believe itself an
objective voice relatively removed from societal influence, the very terms in
which it speaks are evident that it is doubtless influenced by the public
consciousness. Louisiana was not alone in its thinking either, with supreme
courts of both Indiana108 and Wisconsin109 making similar decisions on similar
grounds.
It seems that in the years following these decisions, with the Craig v. Boren
intermediate scrutiny in place in 1976, gendered prostitution statutes would have
been quickly deemed unconstitutional due to the lack of a substantial
relationship to the important government interest of preventing prostitution.
Had the issue ever reached the Supreme Court, it would presumably have ruled
that these laws impermissibly targeted women and not men. But the case history
did not need to move in this direction. It seems that many states in fact had
gender-neutral prostitution statutes on their books, and so the case history postCraig v. Boren is one in which the courts examine whether enforcement in a
gender-biased manner is in fact a violation of Equal Protection. Importantly, the
discussion of these cases still hinges on whether, and to what degree, we accept
the existence of male-male sex exchanges and homosexuality at large.
IV. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AS A VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Before discussing enforcement of anti-sex work statutes, one would
naturally ask, how much of the total sex-work pie is actually composed of male
sex workers? We know that although “the ratio of female to male prostitutes is
unclear,”110 women account for some ninety percent of the total arrests made
under prostitution statutes.111 Law enforcement officials sometimes point to
common policies of using male officers to target female prostitutes as a reason
for these numbers.112 While these numbers do not answer the important question
as to what percentage of all sex work is actually engaged in by men selling
services, the admission of law enforcement officials that they do in fact more
often target women serves to demonstrate that female sex work is more sought
out by law enforcement than its male counterpart. This sort of selective
enforcement is covered by constitutional law through a chain of Supreme Court
decisions.

108. See Wilson v. State, 278 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ind. 1972).
109. See State v. Mertes, 210 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Wis. 1973).
110. Alysa Castro, Note, Student Note: Better in Theory: The Road to Prostitution Reform in
Pennsylvania, 9 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 48-49 (2012) (citing Jacqueline Cooke & Melissa L.
Sontag, Sixth Annual Review Of Gender and Sexuality Law: II. Criminal Law Chapter: Prostitution, 6 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 459, 470 (2005); Gregg Aronson, Seeking a Consolidated Feminist Voice for Prostitution in the
US, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 357, 378 (2006)).
111. Castro, supra note 110, at 49 (citing Jessica N. Drexler, Comment, Governments’ Role in
Turning Tricks: The World’s Oldest Profession in the Netherlands and the United States, 15 DICK. J. INT’L L.
201, 214 (1996)); Aronson, supra note 109, at 378.
112. Castro, supra note 110, at 49 (citing Coty R. Miller & Nuria Haltiwanger, Prostitution and the
Legalization/Decriminalization Debate, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 207, 228 (2004); Cooke & Sontag, supra
note 109, at 477).
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The Supreme Court famously ruled in Yick Wo v. Hopkins that the
discriminatory administration of a facially neutral statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 While the case dealt with the
granting of laundry licenses in a manner that effectively discriminated against
Chinese Americans, the Court’s language in no way limits the doctrine of
discriminatory administration only to victims of racial discrimination:
[T]he facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that,
whatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as adopted, they are
applied by the public authorities charged with their administration, and thus
representing the State itself, with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount
to a practical denial by the State of [equal] protection of the laws.114

While Yick Wo has not been cited by the Court in relation to any case
dealing with gender discrimination, it is reasonable to assume that were the
Court to employ it for that purpose, the discriminatory, or selective, enforcement
would need to withstand intermediate scrutiny itself, namely through substantial
relation to an important governmental interest.115 Yick Wo’s holding was
extended to discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws through Oyler v. Boles,
though it did allow the “‘conscious exercise of some selectivity’ in criminal law
enforcement as long as the selectivity is not based on ‘an unjustifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’”116 Presumably, those
unjustifiable standards would include gender today.
The Minnesota Supreme Court defended the decision of selective
enforcement of its prostitution law against an Equal Protection attack in 1976 in
City of Minneapolis v. Buschette.117 Buschette complained that the City of
Minneapolis had violated her Equal Protection rights by conducting police stings
against sex workers when they had put forth no similar efforts against their
predominantly male customers.118 The statute under which Buschette was
charged is gender neutral, and read as follows: “No person, in any public or
private place, shall offer or submit his or her body indiscriminately for sexual
intercourse, whether or not for a consideration.”119 The court made note of a
series of important facts:

113. See 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered . . . so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”).
114. STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 537 (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373).
115. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”).
116. Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 205-06 (Mass. 1977) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368
U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
117. See 240 N.W.2d 500, 504-05 (Minn. 1976) (notably the same year of the Craig decision, but the
court here is using the rational basis scrutiny of Reed).
118. Id. at 501.
119. Id. (citing MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 870.110).
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A. Minneapolis Code of Ordinances, s 870.110, under which defendant is
charged, applies equally to men and to women;
B. All nine permanent members of the Minneapolis morals squad are men;
C. An important function of the morals squad, as articulated by its then chief
officer, Sergeant Jon Prentice, is to eliminate or control prostitution on the
streets of the city;
D. In the performance of this important duty, the morals squad officer makes
himself available for propositions by suspicious women by acting in the role
of decoy or, in the argot of the profession as the ‘trick’;
E. One hundred ninety adults were charged with prostitution between March
31, 1972, and August 28, 1973, of whom 172 were women and 18, men;
F. On only one occasion, in March 1972, a policewoman was used by the morals
squad as a decoy, and she effected the arrest of 7 of the above 18 men for the
offense of prostitution;
G. Of the remaining 11 men, most, if not all, were female impersonators;
H. Since August 28, 1973, and until October 26, 1973, 29 persons were arrested by
the morals squad and charged with prostitution, 17 of them being female
and 12 of them being male;
I. Of the 12 males arrested by morals squad officers, none of them was arrested
for offering to take money from a female to perform an act of sexual intercourse
with her, but all were arrested after they attempted to solicit a female police
officer by offering her money to do so with them; . . . .
....
L. It is the current intention of the morals squad to continue apprehension of
males as well as females who are engaged in prostitution.120

It is important to note that the large majority of those people arrested
between March 31, 1972 and October 26, 1973 were female and not male. Those
men who were arrested were either trying to solicit a female officer for sex or
were themselves impersonating women (and perhaps would have identified as
women or transgender today). Notably, the facts do not make a single mention of
any sort of same-sex interactions in the city’s anti-sex work efforts.
The court allowed the statute to be subject to a claim of selective
enforcement of the sort described in Yick Wo, and went so far as to list a number
of cases that expanded that doctrine to other types of laws.121 The court described
the claim as one in which the “defense has the burden of producing evidence of
discrimination by a clear preponderance of the evidence. If such intentional and
purposeful discriminatory enforcement is shown, the court has the remedy of
dismissing the charge against the defendant.”122 In Buschette’s case, the court
found that she not only failed to produce evidence of only female arrests, but

120.
121.
122.

Buschette, 240 N.W.2d at 501-02.
See id. at 502-03.
Id. at 503-04.
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that it was the stated intent of the police chief to arrest men and women sex
workers.123
The defendant made the argument that the statistical disparity between
female sex worker arrests to male sex-seeker arrests was enough to show
discriminatory enforcement.124 In response, the court employed a rational basis
review of the decision, and trusted Minneapolis’ assertion that it was more
efficient to concentrate on the assumedly female “‘sellers of sexual services,
rather than on the buyers.’”125 The court concluded that there was indeed, “a
rational relationship between that selectivity and the governmental objective of
controlling prostitution.”126
It is worth noting that in its determination about whether the statute
violates Reed’s rational basis review of an Equal Protection claim, the court
assumes that the sellers of sex are predominately female and the buyers
predominately male’. The defendant herself did not express that the violation
might not lay in targeting female sex workers more than male solicitors of
females, but in the statistical selective enforcement against women. If she had
brought this argument, the court would have needed to engage in a Yick Wo
analysis similar to that used in her first claim of selective enforcement against
female sex workers and not males. But the court already ruled that the
enforcement schema could not be shown to be discriminatory against women as
the defendant had not presented evidence of discrimination. The evidence of that
discrimination would presumably be the statistics of arrests of women for
prostitution as opposed to those of men who were similarly selling sexual
services (even if they were doing so in drag). While the court respected those
statistics enough to engage in rational basis review in regards to the disparity in
arrests of women for selling services to arrests of men seeking them, it somehow
discredited that same data set for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory
enforcement between genders of sex workers, instead trusting implicitly the
police chief’s clearly contradicted assertion that he intends to arrest both men
and women.
Buschette would probably have had to provide evidence that same-sex
interactions were in fact occurring (outside the transgendered ones documented)
before she could assert that the selective enforcement was indeed discriminatory.
The enforcement policy of the city, which provided no documentation that samesex interactions were occurring (again, outside of those transgendered ones that
the court and city seem to map onto a more societally palatable, heteronormative
exchange), meant that the burden on Buschette would have been heavy indeed.
She would have had to produce some evidence of those interactions. The court’s
assumptions, and the enforcement policy itself, are another demonstration of the
way in which the law, and its enforcement mechanism, turned a blind eye to
same-sex exchanges, both in mapping those same-sex exchanges that were
recorded in a heteronormative manner, and by failing to target any openly samesex exchanges.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 504.
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506.
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Massachusetts came to a similar ruling in Commonwealth v. King in 1977, but
with an important distinction.127 Here, the defendant was charged with
prostitution, and as part of her claim that discriminatory enforcement violated
her Equal Protection rights, presented evidence, through the arresting officer’s
testimony, that it was “the practice of the vice squad division of the Boston police
department to file such complaints against only females.”128 The Supreme
Judicial Court disregarded this evidence, instead conjecturing that the officer’s
testimony was not necessarily the official position of the department at large, and
that male sex workers were perhaps being prosecuted under other laws covering
similar conduct instead of the anti-prostitution statute.129 Again, the burden
would be on the defendant to seek out data about the prevalence of same-sex
exchanges and the failure of the police department to enforce against them before
her claim of discriminatory enforcement could stand. Absent concrete evidence
of both, her claim could not proceed. The court here did seem to allow the
assumption that same-sex exchanges were taking place,130 but in a similar fashion
to the Buschette case, demanded a high level of proof of selective enforcement
before it would even hear the claim.
The court surprisingly did not end the case there, and instead continued to
outline what such a claim of discriminatory enforcement would look like, though
it must have known that discussion would in fact be considered dicta. The court
recognized the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment as granting strict
scrutiny to distinctions made on the basis of gender, and also cited to Yick Wo
and Oyler in extending that review to cases of discriminatory enforcement in
criminal proceedings.131 The court concluded that given Massachusetts’
prohibition of sex discrimination and the constitutional framework against
discriminatory enforcement:
[T]he Commonwealth cannot enforce [the anti-prostitution statute] against
female prostitutes but not against male prostitutes unless it can demonstrate a
compelling interest which requires such a policy.
The defendant bears the initial burden of alleging and showing, prima facie,
selective enforcement of the law on the basis of sex, because we presume that
criminal arrests and prosecutions are undertaken in good faith, without intent to
discriminate.132

The case represents progress. The Court openly assumes that same-sex
exchanges do indeed take place and that selective enforcement against female sex

127. See Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196, 199 (Mass. 1977).
128. Id.; See also id. at 204-05 (the defendants also attempted to present statistical evidence at the
appellate level that showed that the police failed to prosecute male prostitutes which they had not
presented at trial; the court ignored that evidence in its determinations).
129. Id. at 205.
130. See id. (“It is left entirely conjectural in the record before us whether males who solicited for
or engages in sexual relations for hire, but were not arrested for prostitution, were charged instead
with any number of other applicable criminal offenses including: . . . the common law crime of
soliciting for an unnatural act . . . .”).
131. See id. at 205-06.
132. Id. at 207.
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workers would indeed be a violation of the Massachusetts Constitution given its
Equal Rights Amendment, but still leaves the burden of proving that
discrimination squarely in the defendant’s lap, and with a rather high standard
of proof that seems difficult to meet. 133
Not surprisingly, there are few cases addressing this issue. The cases above
give us two options to approach Equal Protection claims arising from gender
neutral anti-prostitution laws that seem to be enforced only or predominately
against female-male exchanges; either the defendant must demonstrate only that
enforcement is biased (the liberal approach taken by a state like Massachusetts),
or carry the burden both that enforcement is biased, and that the bias does not
meet intermediate scrutiny’s necessity of bearing a substantial relationship to an
important governmental interest.134 In my final section, I will address the
potential arguments that might be employed to justify selective enforcement
against only female-male exchanges, and analyze the discursive problems that
underlie these arguments.
V. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT AND “REAL” DIFFERENCES FOR PURPOSES OF
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
The case law discussed has demonstrated that under federal law a statute is
subject to intermediate scrutiny when it distinguishes between classes of people
on the basis of gender,135or heightened scrutiny in states with an Equal Rights
Amendment,136 and that those statutes which are selectively enforced in a
discriminatory manner may also violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment if they do not survive the appropriate level of
133. The Supreme Judicial Court later revisited the issue of selective enforcement in
Commonwealth v. Franklin. 385 N.E.2d 227, 233-34 (Mass. 1978). The court clarified the burden of the
defendant:
In order to meet the initial burden in raising a reasonable inference of impermissible
discrimination, defendants must demonstrate (1) ‘that a broader class of persons than those
prosecuted has violated the law,’ (2) ‘that failure to prosecute was either consistent or
deliberate,’ and (3) ‘that the decision not to prosecute was based on an impermissible
classification such as race, religion, or sex.’ Once a defendant has satisfied this tripartite
burden, the prosecution must rebut the inference or suffer a dismissal of the underlying
claim.
Mara Shulman Ryan, Note, Criminal Law—Invisible in the Courtroom Too: Modifying the Law
of Selective Enforcement to Account for White Privilege, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 312 (2012)
(citing Franklin, 385 N.E.2d at 233-34).
While this standard is somewhat clearer, it still places a heavy burden on a presumably
female defendant sex worker to produce evidence that same-sex exchanges are in fact
occurring and that the police department consistently fails to enforce the same antiprostitution law against those same-sex interactions.
134. I arrive at this second approach by first acknowledging a dearth of jurisprudence in the
federal courts. Following the lines of both constitutional case law relating to discriminatory
enforcement and Equal Protection, as well as gender distinctions and Equal Protection, I believe a
defendant would need to demonstrate violations on both levels in order to establish any sort of case
of precedential value.
135. See discussion supra Part III.
136. See King, 372 N.E.2d at 206.
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scrutiny.137 “Real differences” have included the ability to get pregnant,138 a
history of difficulties in the workplace,139 and a history of financial difficulty
generally,140 but as the Court said in VMI, “such classifications may not be used,
as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.”141 If the statute is facially neutral, but in its enforcement
there is an element of selectivity on the part of the executive, we must then ask if
such selective enforcement is in fact discriminatory to the level of a violation of
equal protection.142 Some selectivity is allowed in criminal prosecutions, but that
selectivity cannot be based on impermissible categorizing along lines of race,
religion, or presumably gender.143
In order to best protect both male and female sex workers, these antiprostitution statutes must be enforced equally against both sexes. By only
serving to prosecute women, men and women both suffer in terms of the
imposed social discourse, and in the day-to-day violence that affects both parties.
While the current constitutional schema may indeed protect people from
discrimination today, the Court, and the other 30 states without ERAs, would do
well to close the gap of “real” difference and ensure that heteronormative and
patriarchal ideas of gender difference stop placing men and women into roles
within which they may not fit. If not, we risk the propagation of further
discrimination against women and against those men who may find themselves
in need of the protections offered by banning sex work as a feasible career
option. A close look at the reasoning behind the arguments for difference reveals
that little, if any, difference exists at all.
When analyzing male-male to female-male sex exchanges, the obvious
question becomes, whether there is enough of a real difference between the
harms sought to be avoided in each arrangement such that selectively enforcing
anti-prostitution laws against women and not men is constitutionally
permissible. The answer to this question of course hinges on if real differences
exist, because if they do, then selective enforcement would presumably be
constitutional. If there are no real differences, the purpose of selective
enforcement is not substantially related to an important governmental interest,
the selectivity would not be allowed.
Presumably, it is the larger social harm of the woman engaging in

137. See discussion supra Part IV.
138. See Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (stating that one does
not need to be a doctor to realize that men and women are different because women can get
pregnant).
139. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (discussing the different treatment of men
and women serving as naval officers).
140. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974 (“There can be no dispute that the financial
difficulties confronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing the
man.”).
141. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467
(1948)).
142. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
143. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (“Moreover, the conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.”).
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prostitution as her only viable means of financial support which somewhat
justifies the total banning of female prostitution in most states. Instead of, for
example, allowing high-end escort services to operate, we maintain the
assumption that we are avoiding the potential harms to women that come with
lower level, less lucrative, and more dangerous, street prostitution. If female
prostitution at that low, street level causes social harms, then we can presumably
justify that we as a society value a total ban on female prostitution in order to
avoid line drawing problems (i.e. how high-end is high-end enough?), and to
assert that there may be some harm that comes to society as a whole with the
availability of any female prostitution (an argument put forward by many on
moral and religious grounds). The same argument becomes harder to make
when it is more difficult to identify equivalent and equal social harms in a samesex interaction. For example, where presumably one or both parties identify as
homosexual, (particularly where the prostitute identifies as homosexual), the
threat of heteronormative coercion and power differentials is absent. Admittedly,
the moral and religious argument that any male prostitution is a harm still exists,
but as the Court has said, moral disapproval is not enough to justify a statute.144
But to admit such a difference is to in and of itself implicate a series of
heteronormative structures, wherein we assume that female to male sex is
inherently different from same-sex sexual conduct, and that the male figure is in
a position of power over the woman that he somehow does not occupy vis-à-vis
a male sex worker. This assumption helps to explain the Arab world’s treatment
of homosexuality and homosexual prostitution as existing outside the definitions
of the Western homo/hetero binary, as the active client/participant is able to
maintain his masculinity and heteronormative dominance over a sociallyperceived feminine and submissive passive partner.145 If such traditionalist views
of gender roles and power structures are taken into play, we must ask from the
constitutional perspective whether these traditions are truths, or whether there is
no real difference in the social harms that we seek to subvert. If there is no
difference, we either must admit that we think it wrong for anyone, of any
gender in any sort of male-male, female-male, or female-female pairing, to
engage in sexual activity with the promise of remuneration, or we must identify
a real biological difference that somehow makes same-sex (in the context of this
note, male-male sex) appreciably different from female-male prostitution
scenarios to justify the differing treatment both from a historical legislative view,
and from the current female-male biased enforcement and prosecution route.
There are a number of potential differences, outside the traditional
heteronormative and patriarchal framework, that might be put forward as for
why male-male exchanges represent different problems from female-male
interactions. The most obvious concern is the transmission of HIV. According to
the Center for Disease Control, “in 2010 MSM [men who have sex with men]
accounted for 78% of the new HIV infections among males,” and “the rate of new

144. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (rejecting the state’s argument that the law at
hand protects the freedom of association for the people who object to homosexuality, implying that
those objections do not serve a legitimate government interest).
145. See Needham, supra note 14, at 292 (discussing the power dynamics in Arabic homosexual
relations).
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HIV infections among males . . . was 4.2 times that of females.”146 Some past
research described male sex workers as “‘vectors of disease transmission into the
heterosexual world.’”147 This fear stemmed from the idea that many men taking
part in sex work self-identify as heterosexual and thus would bring home their
work to female partners. But this fear of “infecting” the heterosexual world
ignores the fact that most sex workers identify as gay or bisexual,148 as well as
other studies which have shown that sex workers more often use condoms with
clients than with non-clients.149 Additional research has suggested that “HIV
rates in samples of male sex workers do not differ significantly from rates of HIV
among samples of men who have sex with men in general.”150 Law enforcement
might use the relative safety, then, of male-male sex work to justify that there is
no need to protect public health by targeting these men. This assumes that HIV
transmission is the only appreciable difference between male-male and femalemale exchanges, but this is not the only difference that would likely be put
forward by law enforcement.
A more legally viable difference may be the relative differences in strength
between men and women and the way such differences play out violently in sex
work. The Court suggested in VMI that if women were really physically unable
to participate in the same training as their male counterparts, that physical
strength differences could be considered.151 This line of thinking would allow
that men are stronger than women on average, and so we need to ensure that
women are not physically abused by their clients. As such, we can selectively
enforce against female-male interactions. Similarly, as women are able to get
pregnant and bear children, another difference acknowledged by the Court,152
the government could have an interest in ensuring that children are not born out
of wedlock, or even that pregnancies occur outside of the marriage union.153

146. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Incidence, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/statistics/surveillance/incidence/index.html (last updated May
22, 2013).
147. MICHAEL D. SMITH & CHRISTIAN GROV, IN THE COMPANY OF MEN 26 (2011) (quoting Edward
V. Morse et al., The Male Street Prostitute: A Vector for Transmission of HIV Infection into the Heterosexual
World, 32 SOC. SCI. MED. 535, 535 (1991).
148. See DORAIS, supra note 11, at 10.
149. See SMITH & GROV, supra note 146, at 26 (citing David S. Bimbi, Male Prostitution: Pathology,
Paradigms, and Progress in Research, 53 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 7, 7-35 (2007); David S. Bimbi & Jeffrey T.
Parsons, Barebacking Among Internet Based Male Sex Workers, 9 J. GAY & LESBIAN PSYCHOTHERAPY 85,
85-105 (2005); Matthew J. Mimiaga et al., Street Workers and Internet Escorts, 86 J. URB. HEALTH 54, 5466 (2009); M. Parker, Core Groups and the Transmission of HIV: Learning from Male Sex Workers, 00 J.
BIOSOCIAL SCI. 1, 1-15 (2005); M.D. Smith & D.W. Seal, Sexual Behavior, Mental Health, Substance Use,
and HIV Risk Among Agency-Based Male Escorts in a Small U.S. City, 19 INT’L J. SEXUAL HEALTH 27, 27-39
(2007)).
150. SMITH & GROV, supra note 147, at 26 (citing I. Vanwesenbeeck, Another Decade of Social
Scientific Work on Sex Work: A Review of the Research 1990-2000, 12 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 242, 242-300
(2001)).
151. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (explaining that the program was not
found to be so strenuous that a woman could not complete it).
152. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981).
153. An argument itself advanced by proponents of Proposition 8 in California, where it was
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Numerous studies have shown that male sex workers do themselves experience
violence,154 although one might ask whether the violence is of the same level or
concern as that found in female-male interactions. Men certainly cannot get
pregnant, so that concern has no equivalent in the male-male situation. These
concerns, then, might both be considered valid from a constitutional, legal
perspective, and could perhaps withstand intermediate scrutiny if a defendant
could first demonstrate that selective enforcement itself exists. The fact that this
discriminatory enforcement might be found constitutional highlights some major
problems with the ways in which we consider gender differences themselves as a
matter of constitutional law. Both of these examples implicate the concern,
discussed above, that in treating male-male sex as something inherently different
from female-male sex, devoid of the elements of coercion and force that are read
into heterosexual exchanges, both men and women suffer. Men, because they are
denied the protection, admittedly of a patriarchal state, that comes with
admitting the same dangers inherent to all prostitution, and women in that we
frame the prostitution discourse as one of a female victim and male abuser,
denying women the sexual freedom to pursue prostitution with dignity and
respect.
Massachusetts, as highlighted above, is one of twenty states which have
decided for themselves that intermediate scrutiny will not suffice when facing
statutes which discriminate, either facially or through selective enforcement, on
the basis of sex, through enactment of Equal Rights Amendments that cover sex
in their state constitutions.155 These states have decided that the differences
accepted by the Supreme Court are not valid reasons for discriminatory
treatment under the law. In this way they may be seen as echoing the reasoning
of MacKinnon,156 that in acknowledging these sorts of differences we are in effect
continuing to accept discrimination, perhaps creating more of a difference than
actually exists.
The discourse of difference itself can be used to rob women of the equality
they deserve, and conversely, place male sex workers in a disadvantaged
position. In the context of sex work, if we accept the proposition that women are
more at risk of violence in female-male exchanges than men in male-male
exchanges,157 we as a society are robbing women of their own strength to resist
violence or to assert themselves by stating that they are in fact less capable of
protecting themselves. Through this sort of discourse we weaken what strength
argued that expanding the definition of marriage would affect heterosexual couples’ incentives to
marry and have children within the married relationship. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 26-34,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
154. See generally DORIAS, supra note 11; SMITH & GROV, supra note 147; WEST, supra note 6.
155. See LESLIE W. GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENTS:
STATE PROVISIONS 1 (1999), available at http://maloney.house.gov/sites/maloney.house.gov
/files/documents/olddocs/era/CRS.pdf.
156. See STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 652 (quoting CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 3, 8-9 (1987)). (JW, Rule 1, 4.2, 15).
157. While studies have shown that male sex workers experience violence, it is unclear whether
they experience it at the same level as female sex workers. See WEST, supra note 6, at 99 (describing the
risk of violence that goes along with male prostitution); See also DORAIS, supra note 11, at 67
(describing male sex workers’ violent incidents).
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they may indeed have and send a signal to men and women alike that women
are vulnerable to attacks. A similar set of reasoning follows from the pregnancy
argument: by stating that the government has an interest in ensuring that
pregnancies occur within wedlock, we deny women the power to be self-selected
single parents, and somewhat rob them of autonomy over their own procreative
choices, insinuating that while women can end a pregnancy in marriage,158 they
must be married to a man in order to exercise the choice of actually having a
baby.
Men, too, suffer when we accept these differences. As discussed above, men
too experience violence at the hands of their clients, and in failing to enforce antiprostitution laws against men, those male sex workers are less likely to be
protected from abusive clients. By essentially stating that these men should be
able to protect themselves, we shame male sex workers into not reporting the
crimes committed against them, for to do so would be to admit emasculation at
the hands of another man. In short, by acknowledging “real” differences, all we
do is reinforce heteronormative stereotypes about the roles that men and women
should play in society, both on the streets and in the bedroom, and in the
process, we hurt everyone.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while the Supreme Court could ultimately find that the
differences between men and women are such that selective enforcement of antiprostitution laws against women and not men is constitutional, such a decision
would bring to light a number of issues regarding the way that the Court, and
we as a society, have framed the difference between men and women. While
there are indeed physical differences between the sexes, sweeping
generalizations about these differences, from deeming women physically
weaker, to calling men more aggressive, only serves to further entrench gender
stereotypes that many may find an ill fit. As far as prostitution goes, selective
enforcement against women sends a message to women that they are in need of
more help, that they are weaker than their male counterparts. The same selective
enforcement simultaneously infers that male-male exchanges are not a social
problem, that men can take care of themselves, and that we as a society would
rather turn a blind eye than ensure that these men are given the same
protections, via enforcement, that women have. Law enforcement agencies
would do well to alter their enforcement policies so as to end this mixed message
of discrimination and gender stereotyping. At the same time, the courts should
reexamine the way in which “real” difference has been framed, closing any gaps
that may allow for discrimination on the simple basis of traditional gender, and
heteronormative, stereotyping.

158. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining how a woman’s autonomy to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is encompassed in a general right of privacy).

